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ABSTRACT
Tax havens and tax flight have lately received increasing attention, while
interest toward multilateral trade policies has somewhat diminished. We
argue that more attention needs to be paid exactly to the interrelations
between trade and tax policies. Drawing from two case studies on
Panama’s trade disputes, we show how World Trade Organization (WTO)
rules can be used both to resist attempts to sanction secrecy structures and
to promote measures against tax flight. The theory of new
constitutionalism can help to explain how trade treaties can ‘lock in’ tax
policies. However, our case studies show that trade policy not only ‘locks
in’ democratic policy-making, but also enables tax havens to use their
commercialized sovereignty to resists anti-secrecy measures. What is being
‘locked in’ are the policy tools, not necessarily the policies. The changing
relationship between trade and tax policies can also create new and
unexpected tools for tackling tax evasion, underlining the importance of
epistemic arbitrage in the context of new constitutionalism. In principle,
political actors with sufficient technical and juridical knowledge can shape
global tax governance to various directions regardless of their formal
position in the world political hierarchies. This should be taken into
account when trade treaties are being negotiated or revised.
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1. INTRODUCTION: TAXATION AND TAX HAVENS ON
THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA
In this article, we analyze the policy implications of the increasing con-
vergence and overlap of trade policy and tax policy. Specifically, we
show how trade policy tools can be used to resist initiatives against tax
evasion. This will be done by analyzing two case studies on trade dis-
putes initiated by Panama, in the context of other recent changes in the
international tax and trade policies. We argue that, first, there is a need
for a more detailed analysis of the trade-tax nexus, and second, that a
given position of international capital can be ‘locked in’ by the active use
of trade policy tools than enable tax havens to resist tax policy initiatives.
Third, this convergence of trade and tax governance not only locks in pol-
icies but can also open up new and unintended avenues to challenge the
power of global capital. This highlights the importance of epistemic arbi-
trage of policy professionals. Moreover, it shows that it is a more complex
phenomenon than is sometimes thought. We will use the theory of ‘new
constitutionalism’ as a starting point and further show how our findings
lead to some implications on the need to reconsider the theory.
Tax havens and tax evasion have indeed become topical fields within
global policy. In April 2016, the International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists began publishing exposes on 11.5 million leaked documents
containing information on more than 214,000 offshore companies
founded with the help of a Panamanian law firm and corporate service
provider, Mossack Fonseca. In addition to individual investors, the scan-
dal involved a great number of major banks from every part of the world.
These banks had received assistance from Mossack Fonseca in opening
tax haven accounts for their clients. Several politicians in different coun-
tries had to resign. Far from being an isolated event, the Panama papers
leak was a continuation in a series of recent tax information leaks from
Liechtenstein, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Public debates and pres-
sure (Dallyn 2016) have been followed by increased academic attention,
which in turn has significantly improved understanding of the mecha-
nisms, actors and structures of tax avoidance and tax evasion.
The nascent literature on global tax governance has focused mostly on
tax-specific initiatives, and until very recently, the causes of tax competi-
tion have been neglected in the international political economy literature
(Rixen 2011, 3). The 1998 OECD Harmful Tax Competition initiative has
been the most important single event for generating global tax gover-
nance research (e.g. Kudrle 2008; Sanders 2002; Sharman 2006; Webb
2004). Since then, several other initiatives have followed, most notably
the OECD-led Base Erosion, Profit Shifting (BEPS) project that began in
2013 (OECD 2013; see also Eccleston and Smith 2016). Subsequent anti-
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tax haven and transparency initiatives launched by the G20 group, Euro-
pean Union (EU) and the United States have also generated interest.
These include the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act by the United
States, the OECD-led template for Automatic Information Exchange in
tax matters, and several recent EU directives, such as the directive for the
exchange of information on national tax agreements negotiated by states
with large corporations (Grinberg 2016).1 Typically, the existing
governance research covering this field has provided analyses on policy
efforts in the framework of tax-specific work of OECD, EU and the
United States. A key question is whether it pays sufficient attention to the
major institutional and structural interdependencies: trade policies in
particular.
The recent EU state aid cases against tax incentives granted by Ireland
and the Netherlands to Apple and Starbucks (EC 2014a, EC 2014b) have
drawn some public attention to the overlaps between trade-related goals
and tax policies in the field of subsidies. This theme generated attention
in the international tax law scholarship around the turn of the millen-
nium (Bratton and McCahery, 2001; Pinto 1998; Sch€on 1999) but less so
within the tax governance literature. In addition, in the early 2000s, the
Harmful Tax Competition initiative provided inspiration for a body of aca-
demic literature discussing international tax regulation also from the
viewpoint of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and
World Trade Organization (WTO) treaties (Avi-Yonah 2001; Brauner
2005; McDaniel 2000; 2004; Slemrod and Avi-Yonah 2001; see also Killian
2006, 1085). These studies found that trade treaties both fostered and hin-
dered policy options for curbing harmful tax exemptions and tax
competition.
However, the aforementioned studies did not seem to provoke further
research as the general interest toward trade policy issues waned. This
neglect of trade-tax policy linkages has also been highlighted in the after-
math of Panama Papers. While there has been at least some policy-level
discussion on tax-related aspects in the US–Panama Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA) of 2007 (Kessier 2016), similar developments have not been
seen in the academia. This is unfortunate, as the dynamics between trade
policies and tax policies have undergone significant changes since the
early 2000s. With the notable exceptions of Farrell (2013) and Bastin
(2014), we have not been able to find meaningful analyses from recent
years on how trade policy affects anti-tax avoidance initiatives. This is
hardly surprising, however, since global tax governance only emerged as
a serious research topic in international relations about ten years ago
(Dietsch and Rixen 2016, 1). Moreover, the latest research on the interrela-
tions between trade and taxation focuses often on the effects of trade pol-
icy on domestic taxes such as the VAT (Seelkopf, Lierse and Schmitt
2016), rather than on tax avoidance.
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Here we aim to show how trade treaties and related arbitration proce-
dures can affect the efforts to tackle international tax flight. We begin in
Section 2 with a discussion on the expansion of trade policy to include
policy fields beyond its historical scope. Section 3 focuses on the rise of
international tax avoidance and tax evasion to the global governance
agenda, and how the existing academic literature has addressed trade
policy related preconditions for tackling tax flight. We then proceed to
our case study of Panama in Section 4. The case study discusses the FTA
and its potential impact on the international and United States led efforts
to tackle tax evasion, and it also analyses Panama’s use of trade dispute
settlements to protect its secrecy. Finally, the penultimate Section 5
discusses theoretical contributions related to the trade-tax nexus. We
conclude by analyzing how these analytical frameworks should
be updated, and to what extent can the conclusions from the case studies
be generalized.
2. THE EXPANSION OF TRADE POLICY AND THE
POLITICS OF ‘CONSTITUTIONALISM’
The recent history of trade policy has been a history of expansion, reori-
entation and constant negotiation of the political scope of ‘trade’ and
‘trade-related’. The GATT focused almost entirely on tariff issues for
most of its history before the inception of the WTO. Yet already the 1980s
saw the development of new areas of negotiation as intellectual property
issues emerged to the trade policy field. After the inception of the WTO,
new policy issues have been recurrently pushed into the trade policy
frame. In several cases, the linkages to traditional trade policies are ques-
tionable: procurement, public services, competition, investment protec-
tion and so on have no immediate link to tariff policy. Such thematic
expansion leads unavoidably to overlap of policy fields, which was very
visible already with trade in services, which includes financial services.
This expansion has never occurred without opposition (Deere 2008;
Verger and Bonal 2006). Even so, trade policy has evidently become
something of a general global policy field. Indeed, with the notorious
exception of agriculture, the most heated debates in trade policy during
the WTO era have dealt with issues that do not directly involve tariffs on
goods. Furthermore, the key political struggles have often been fought
over the inclusion of particular issues to the trade policy field rather than
the actual content of agreements, with intellectual property rights being a
case in point (Borowiak 2004; Sell 2001). The outcomes of the negotiations
between trade policy and other policy fields are twofold. First, new
extensions of trade policy often means that trade policy overrules exist-
ing policies in other policy areas. Second, policy lock-ins generated by
trade agreements can affect policy efforts in ways that were
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unforeseeable when the agreements were originally negotiated. In some
areas, this negotiation with other policy fields has received considerable
attention (such as, again, intellectual property), yet other important
fields, such as tax policy, have received insufficient attention.
The expansion of trade policy can be seen as an outcome of ad hoc
‘forum shifting’ (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Sell 2010): when given
political players push for given political goals, they seek arenas in which
the existing practices, rules of conduct and power relations are most suit-
able for advancing the desired policy goals, given that it is in their power
to influence the choice of arena.2 Trade and tax policies are particularly
vulnerable for these kinds of practices because of their importance to
major corporations and their lobbyists. It is quite well documented, for
instance, how the GATT was explicitly chosen as the most suitable arena
for pushing the liberalization of trade in services (Raghavan 1990). Simi-
larly, in tax issues, trade policy is likely to be the preferred policy field
for tax havens3, compared to other international fora.
However, we need to go deeper than this. Here, it is useful to analyze
trade policy as an expression of ‘new constitutionalism’ (Raghavan 1990;
Schneiderman 2000). The concept was coined for theorizing the globali-
zation of a given market discipline, which restrained the capacity of
nation-states to control the powers of international capital. As such
power is highly dependent on the laws and other institutions of nation-
state, the emphasis of the theory was on the creation of ‘disciplinary neo-
liberalism’ and its politico-legal dimension, in contrast to the general
‘liberalization’ of finance (Gill 1998a, Gill 2002). This disciplinary neolib-
eralism shares some key characteristics with constitutions at the national
level in entrenching policies, procedures and rights, and in being very
difficult to reverse even by majority vote, therefore, the term
‘constitutional’. Future governments are thus inhibited from reconsider-
ing economic policy as it is insulated it from the domain of traditional
politics. Trade agreements can be interpreted from this perspective as
transnational quasi-constitutions, protecting the interests of corporate
capital and transnational investors by creating global uniform and bind-
ing rules for this purpose (Clarkson 2002). As the field of trade policy has
expanded, trade agreements have taken ever more pronouncedly such
quasi-constitutional role in the global economy.
The domestic forms of such ‘new constitutionalism’ can take different
forms. The regulatory chill effect creates pressure on the domestic policy-
makers to consider only measures that are known to conform with the
‘constitutional’ agreements, while the lock-in effect effectively binds gov-
ernments to the current level of liberalization (Krajewski 2011). Thus the
former self-disciplines politicians and regulators, while the latter leads
into actual sanctions by supernational political bodies. Domestically
important policies can be sanctioned and outlawed by dispute settlement
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bodies (DSBs), when a trading party actively seeks to undermine these
domestic policies. This can lead to a regulatory chill, as policy-makers
become wary of using politically efficient means for achieving given pol-
icy goals.
Researchers have pointed out examples of ‘policy lock-in’ in virtually
all kinds of trade negotiations, with possibly the most evident case being
negotiation on trade in services such as GATS (Robertson 2003, Sreeniva-
san 2005). Russell Williams sees the very essence of ‘new con-
stitutionalism’ to be an attempt to ‘strike when the iron is hot’: while
support for given practices might decline over time, deliberate policy
lock-in hinders the attempts to push through changes at a later point
domestically (Williams 2002, 80). While some policy issues might remain
open after signing the agreements, they quickly take the form of judicial
matters instead of traditional political disputes. There are also examples
of attempts to push for comprehensive deals that do not allow with-
drawal. As one researcher observed on the GATS negotiations: ‘teams
from OECD nations deliberately tried to “bamboozle” opposing coun-
tries […] The attitude of the developed countries negotiation teams was
“sign now, define later”’ (Raghavan 1990, 108).
Yet curiously, this theorizing almost invariably associates democratic
politics with national sovereignty, as popular sovereignty is taken as a
manifestation of democratic powers (Schneiderman 2000). Nonetheless
the opposite can be the main concern in taxation issues. In discussions on
tax havens, for instance, a commonly noted problem has been the capac-
ity of small states to commercialize their sovereignty (Palan 2002) by
using their national sovereignty to create legal ‘innovations’ demanded
by the tax avoidance industry. Therefore, in contrast to much of the new
constitutionalism literature, progressive tax policy does not necessarily
equal protecting national jurisdictions from transnational policy lock-ins.
This is true especially in an era when the Big 4 auditing companies are
helping secrecy jurisdictions to design their tax laws and large corpora-
tions can easily discern their internal wealth chains from value chains
(Christensen and Murphy 2004; Otusanya 2011; Seabrooke and Wigan
2014; Seabrooke and Wigan in press; Sikka in press; Sikka and Hampton
2005, Sikka and Willmott 2010). Rather, progressive trade policy should
be seen as a tool used by sovereign nations to push other sovereigns to
adhere with effective tax information exchange and other similar
initiatives.
In other words, the new constitutionalism of trade policy can set the
limits within which both popular sovereignty and commercialized sover-
eignty can operate. The question is, then, how can trade policy be effec-
tively used in taxation issues. The political core of trade policy in such
cases does not appear to be introducing (binding) rules but rather effec-
tive tools, which can be used at will to affect global policies on other
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policy fields. What is more, the ability to use these tools requires sophisti-
cated expertise from fields that have so far been marginalized in interna-
tional tax discussions, which highlights the role of epistemic arbitrage in
policy making. This issue is further complicated by the fact that global
trade policy consists of several overlapping, yet imperative, trade policy
systems.
Next, we will move on to discuss the overlap and the convergence of
trade and tax policies based on this theoretical background. The discus-
sion on the history of policy convergence and recent case studies will
demonstrate how the dominant economic forces are ‘insulated from dem-
ocratic rule and popular accountability’ (Gill 1998b, 23), yet in a manner
which calls for some reconsideration of the form of lock-in as it is typi-
cally described by the new constitutionalist theory.
3. TRADE AND TAXES: A MIXED HISTORY OF POLICY
CONVERGENCE
Tax issues have become more prominent in the trade agenda with the
emergence of trade in services. As services naturally include financial
services, and tax avoidance increasingly happens through intangible
rights, trade agreements might facilitate illicit financial activities. Defin-
ing investment broadly in the agreements to include complex financial
instruments, mere expectations of gain, and so on further exacerbates the
problem. Moreover, the concept of state aid has recently expanded at
least in the EU, encompassing not only direct subsidies to local compa-
nies but also different forms of ‘tax competition’ or tax wars. These
changes force to reconsider the complementarity of the two regimes.
The first interventions of trade policy into tax issues broadened the def-
inition of tax-related export subsidies to include ‘the full or partial
exemption, remission or deferral [of tax] specifically related to exports’ in
the 1979 GATT Subsidies/Countervailing Measures Agreement (McDa-
niel 2000, 1628). The pre-1985 version of GATT does not appear to have
been invoked frequently in tax-related disputes. The notable exception is
the challenge by the European Community and Canada to the US
Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) regime. A panel of
experts established by the GATT Council deemed ‘that DISC conferred a
tax benefit related to exports’. The Treasury aggressively promoted the
use of DISCs by US corporations and issued annual reports showing that
exports had increased as a result of the DISC regime. This evidence made
it rather easy for the panel to conclude that DISC constituted an ‘export
subsidy’ (McDaniel 2000, 1627). The same panel concluded that the
French exemption of income from export sales likewise was a subsidy
under GATT. The key to this seemingly surprising result was that France,
Belgium, and the Netherlands were applying their exemption systems to
635
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transactions that originated in their respective countries, not just to trans-
actions that took place wholly outside their countries (McDaniel 2000,
1628).
The realization of tax holidays as potentially trade-distorting acts was
the first clear instance of the conflict between these two policy domains.
The prominence of the trade-in-services negotiations in the Uruguay
Round, and the growing presence of foreign direct investment,
highlighted how taxation of factor incomes can constitute a fiscal barrier
to trade (Slemrod and Avi-Yonah 2001, 533). The GATT Subsidies Code
defines ‘subsidy’ as including cases where government revenue that is
otherwise due is foregone or not collected. To be actionable under the
GATT, a subsidy must be ‘specific to an enterprise or an industry or
group of enterprise or industries’ (Avi-Yonah 2001, 1684-1685).
Subsequently, new rounds of GATT created the WTO and expanded
significantly its scope in tax affairs. The first step under the WTO pro-
cesses is to establish that a challenged provision is a subsidy. A
‘prohibited subsidy’ is contingent on export performance or requires the
use of domestic rather than imported goods, i.e. an export subsidy. In
turn, the term export subsidy includes ‘full or partial exemption, remis-
sion or deferral, specifically related to exports, of direct taxes’, and the
allowance of ‘special deductions’ directly related to exports or export
performance (Avi-Yonah 2001, 1630).
The EC has moved quite aggressively to challenge special tax provi-
sions that it believes conflict with Article 92(1) and its own tests interpret-
ing that article. In 1998, it adopted a formal set of guidelines which, if
violated, would prohibit all preferential tax provisions that adversely
affect trade and competition among EU states (Avi-Yonah 2001, 1634).
These guidelines coincided with the aforementioned OECD’s Harmful
Tax Practices initiative but have not received equal attention in the global
governance research, even though it marked the beginning of a signifi-
cant shift in the definition of state aid in the EU. Originally restrained to
direct subsidies, the soft law approach adopted by the EC and supported
by the 1998 Code of Conduct of Business Practices has gradually
expanded to tax issues. One milestone in this development were the 2014
landmark decisions that prohibited the tax incentives that Ireland and
the Netherlands had granted to Apple and Starbucks as market-distort-
ing state aid (EC 2014a; 2014b).
Transfer pricing and the taxation of TNCs pose the biggest challenge to
current trade regimes, as identifying and measuring ‘market-based’ pri-
ces for exports, imports, and even for intra-firm financing is extremely
difficult. There are several potential problems. First, it is sometimes diffi-
cult to determine whose income is identified and measured. The defini-
tions of resident and nonresident taxpayers differ. Second, the arm’s
length principle championed by OECD and bilateral tax treaties that are
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usually based on it provide rules for dividing incomes within companies,
but their application is far from straightforward (Clausing 2003; Durst
and Culbertson 2003; Eden 2016; Picciotto 1992; 2016), and the new initia-
tives by OECD and individual countries have fallen short from abolish-
ing artificial profit shifting. As a result, corporations get large freedoms
to decide where they want to show profit (Yl€onen and Teivainen 2015).
Considering all this, EC’s decision to consider transfer-pricing related tax
incentives as de facto subsidies was in many ways understandable
(Braumer 2005, 279).
Typically, trade agreements permit a wide range of exceptions, but
these exceptions need to be explicitly specified in the contract. Thus prob-
lems arise when required policies have not been foreseen in the trade
negotiations. There are examples of trade agreements where one party of
the agreement has knowingly under-regulated some aspect of its econ-
omy, and the other party has later unsuccessfully challenged this under-
regulation in WTO.4 Therefore, one could expect that a country with
intentionally under-regulated financial services could find interventions
against these practices as a violation of the trade agreement. Further-
more, the use of investor-state dispute settlements has grown in place of
conventional inter-state disputes. This increases the likelihood that finan-
cial actors use arbitration panels to protect themselves against anti-tax
avoidance policies.
To further complicate the issue, Bastin (2014) has suggested that WTO
rules could also be used to advocate for more stringent control of trans-
fer-pricing rules. In key role here is the Committee on Customs Valua-
tions (CCV) of the WTO and its sister committee in the World Customs
Organization, namely the Technical Committee on Customs Valuations
(TCCV). Both committees are engaged in transfer pricing related work.
According to Bastin, the most important outcome from the CCV’s and
TCCV’s work on transfer pricing to date is the TCCV’s Commentary 23.
This Commentary points to the Article 1(2)(a) of the WTO’s Customs Val-
uation Agreement5, which states that the ‘circumstances surrounding the
sale’ should be used to assist the determination of whether the relation-
ship between the parties influenced the price (Bastin 2014, 69). This arti-
cle could potentially be used to tackle aggressive corporate tax
avoidance. Moreover, Bastin (2014, 76) highlights the Article XXIII(1)(b)
of GATT. It dictates that
(1) if any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing
to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or
impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is
being impeded as the result of (…)
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure,
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement (…)
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the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment
of the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other
contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any
contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consider-
ation to the representations or proposals made to it.
In principle, this article could also be used to challenge tax-driven
transfer-pricing decisions. However, effective application of these articles
and commentaries would require both sufficient knowledge on interna-
tional trade and tax law, and the political will and vision to employ this
knowledge. The concept of epistemic arbitrage by Seabrooke (2014, 50)
can be useful in understanding this dynamic. Epistemic arbitrage refers
to the ways in which ‘particular professionals are able to exploit differen-
ces in professional knowledge pools for strategic advantage by position-
ing particular forms of knowledge as the most appropriate to deal with
particular problems’. When successful, ‘those engaging in epistemic arbi-
trage—the arbitrageurs—can become epistemic “arbiters” who decide
how to address transnational problems and who can address them’
(Seabrooke 2014, 50). While the significance of expertise has been noted
for example in reference to the capacity of civil society organizations to
influence trade policy (Trommer 2014), increasing convergence of trade
and tax policies creates a demand for new kinds of experts or teams of
experts that can operate simultaneously in both domains. Thus the suc-
cessful utilization of the lock-in of policy tools depends increasingly on
how well states or interest groups are able to tap in to these epistemic
communities. Related to this, the next section will discuss how Panama
was able to invoke WTO rules to defend its tax regime.
4. THE CASE OF PANAMA
As noted in the beginning of this article, Panama has been active in link-
ing tax issues to the broader trade agenda. Of particular interest are the
two WTO arbitration cases that Panama has initiated in recent years. The
first case dealt with anti-money laundering efforts by Colombia, and the
second one tried to overhaul Argentinian attempts to enforce an interna-
tional ‘black list’ of tax havens. Both cases can be deemed as wins for Pan-
ama, although the results of the latter case were mixed. A point of further
interest is how these cases have influenced trade policy related discus-
sions in the United States amidst the negotiations for the US–Panama
FTA and the Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) that was
negotiated around the same time.
A country with a population of less than four million people, Panama
is home to more than 350,000 secretive International Business Compa-
nies, second only to Hong Kong and the British Virgin Islands. Panama
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has been an active promoter for secretive and tax-evading trusts and
foundations, as well as being a major player in insurance, boat and ship-
ping registration (Financial Secrecy Index 2015). This offshore interface
(Christensen 2011) and the accompanying ancillary legal and tax services
have made Panama a prominent destination for tax-driven financial
flows. It occupies the 15th place in the 2015 Financial Secrecy Index,
which compares jurisdictions based both on the infrastructure they offer
for concealing investments, as well as their importance in the world
economy.6
The history of Panamanian financial services dates back to 1903, when
the United States supported a revolution in the area that had been a prov-
ince of Colombia. A year after this W. H. Taft, who was the US Secretary
of War and commissioner of the projected canal, drafted a legislation that
formed the basis of the Panamanian financial system. In the same year,
the predecessor of Citibank started business in Panama (Naylor 2004,
186). The Panamanian Flag of Convenience registry began operation in
1919, when Panama helped Standard Oil to avoid US taxes by starting to
register foreign vessels. Financial flows followed, as Wall Street interests
pushed Panama to introduce secrecy-oriented business incorporation
laws in 1927 (Robinson 2003; Shaxson 2011) and trust legislation in 1941
(Aguilar-Alfu 2012). As late as in the 1960s, Panama was one of the only
11 financial centers listed by the US Federal Reserve (quoted in Naylor
2004, xi), highlighting its pioneering role. This can be contrasted with
some 70 centers the IMF listed in the late 1990s (Errico and Musalem
1999).
The OECD’s Harmful Tax Practices initiative began in 1998. Panama did
not commit to reforms based on the OECD’s blacklist of non-compliant
jurisdictions (Sharman 2006, 15). What is more, it was also one of the 14
jurisdictions that formed the International Tax and Investment Organiza-
tion ITIO in March 2001 to counter OECD anti-tax-avoidance efforts
(Sharman 2006, 59).7 In the post-financial crisis environment, Panama
also reacted aggressively to the OECD-led blacklisting effort, for example
by denying Spanish companies access from bidding on the lucrative con-
tracts in the expansion of the Panama Canal (Panama Investor 2008).
At the time of writing, Panama has 14 double tax agreements (DTAs)
and nine TIEAs in force and more pending (International Bar Association
2016). The DTA partner countries involve major economies such as the
Czech Republic, France, Israel, Mexico, Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom, but also Barbados, Luxembourg and the United Arab Emi-
rates. With the exception of Canada and the United States, Panama has
signed all of its TIEAs with a group of Nordic countries that negotiated
these agreements jointly after the 2007–2009 financial crisis, offering
many tax havens a convenient way to escape the second coming of the
OECD’s blacklists.8 Moreover, both the Canadian and the US TIEA
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contained a clause that allowed Panama to deny an information request
‘where the disclosure of the information requested would be contrary to
the public policy of the requested Party’.9 Finally, Panama has also been
one of the few tax havens to effectively opt out from the OECD’s ongoing
effort to expand automatic exchange of tax information, even though the
OECD model still retains several loopholes and thus leaves room for con-
tinuing a secrecy-based development strategy (see, e.g. Bachus 2015; Car-
diel 2016; Rose 2016).
Panama’s refusal to engage in effective international tax cooperation
has been accompanied with its use of trade policies to restrict attempts
by other countries to curtail tax flight and financial crime. Panama has
been a member of the WTO since 1997. During that time, it has been
complainant in seven disputes, a respondent in one dispute and a third
party in eight cases. Since October 2012, Panama also has a new trade
agreement in force with the United States, replacing US unilateral prefer-
ential trade treatment under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act, the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act and the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) (Hornbeck, 2012). Panama has typically
signed cooperation agreements only under pressure and even then, com-
pliance has often remained half-hearted.
We focus on two particular cases in which Panama was the complainant,
out of the total of five issues that Panama has brought to the WTO (one
issue consisting of three similar cases related to banana trade with the EU).
Case 453 is related directly to anti-tax avoidance initiatives applied by
Argentina. Case 366 dealt with Colombian efforts to enforce anti-money
laundering measures. We will present these two cases in Subsections 4.1
and 4.2. The cases are similar to each other in their political significance:
using trade agreements to avoid being subject to effective policies against
tax flight. Yet they utilize different domains of trade agreements: trade in
goods covered by the GATT in 1994 in the case of Colombia, and trade in
financial services covered by the GATS in the case of Argentina.
4.1. The case against Argentina’s anti-tax haven efforts
The case against Argentina started in December 2012, when Panama
brought a complaint to the WTO regarding a range of tax, investment,
and services measures that Argentina had imposed against a number of
countries, which it classified ‘non-cooperative’. The non-cooperative
country status was assigned to countries that refused to sign an agree-
ment with Argentina on the exchange of tax information, or initiate the
necessary negotiations (Panel report10 7.182, referring to Argentine legal
code 589/2013). The measures included ‘less favorable tax treatment in
the collection of profits taxes, discriminatory tax treatment on funds
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entering from the listed countries, discrimination in the valuation of
transactions with persons from the listed countries, and discriminatory
criteria with respect to tax deductions’ (Zagaris 2015, 40), as well as the
criteria for entering the Argentine reinsurance market. The contested leg-
islation consisted of eight separate measures (Panel report 2.13, 2.17,
2.19-2.20, 2.21-2.22, 2.26-2.27, 2.35, 2.37, 2.39-2.40).
Panama argued that these measures illegally discriminated against for-
eign service providers. According to the challenge, Argentina restricted
market access for reinsurance and retrocession services from the listed
countries and imposed authorization requirements ‘for the purchase of
foreign exchange and the repatriation of direct investments by entities in
the listed countries’. Panama considered these measures a violation of
Argentina’s WTO commitments as well as the organization’s core princi-
ples (Zagaris 2015, 40). Specifically, Panama challenged the consistency
of the measures with Article II:1 of the GATS.
In a significant passage, Argentina informed that it had now removed
any references to ‘countries with low or no taxation’, including Panama,
from the decrees (Zagaris 2015, 40). This effectively aligned Argentina’s
decrees with the fiscal transparency coordination criteria of the OECD.
Despite the loopholes in the OECD’s information exchange models, Pan-
ama was not convinced. It deemed the changes ‘superficial’ and
‘cosmetic’. In way of a response, WTO’s DSB decided to establish a panel
to settle the dispute on 25 June 2013. The panel report was circulated in
September later that year, and the final appellate body report was pub-
lished in 14 April 2016.
In its response to the DSB, Argentina argued that the measures were
‘defensive tax measures’, and were in line with the recommendations of
the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax
Purposes (Panel report 7.527), as well as with G20 guidelines. According
to Argentina, the measures were designed to prevent tax evasion, tax
avoidance and fraud (Panel report 7.527, 7.534). Argentina further argued
that Article XIV(c) of the GATS allows actions to prevent deceptive and
fraudulent practices, and as its measures aimed at countering harmful
tax practices, they were arguably consistent with the GATS (Panel report
7.534-7.535). Furthermore, Argentina argued that paragraph 2(a) of
GATS Annex on Financial Services justified some of the measures, as it
allows protecting ‘financial consumers from distortions and abusive
situations’.
In its complaint, Panama argued that GATS aimed solely at securing
non-discrimination between producers of (financial) services, suggesting
that Panama saw trade policy, and particularly GATS, as tools to con-
tinue resisting international tax cooperation. It argued this position
clearly in a submission to the appellate body after the panel decision,
which itself was positive for Panama. Panama appeared to understand
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the rationale behind the imposed measures, but argued that they went
beyond the means necessary to secure compliance with laws and regula-
tions on fraudulent transactions (Panama’s appellants’ submission 5.100,
referred to in Appellate body’s report 6.214). Panama maintained that
the policy statements derived from the OECD and G-20 reports were gen-
eral, abstract, and non-country-specific (Panama’s appellant’s submission
4.37, appellate body’s report 6.149). Furthermore, Panama emphasized
non-discrimination and equally favorable treatment, and saw any politi-
cal sensibilities as a secondary concern. (Appellate body’s report 6.62).
Noteworthily, the panel accepted Argentina’s argument that transac-
tions with entities of non-cooperative countries enable tax evasion
because of the secrecy laws in these countries (Panel report 7.655). The
Panel argued that most of the contested measures contributed to the safe-
guarding Argentina’s tax collection system and to the prevention of
money laundering (Panel report 7.713, 7.717). It also found support for
Argentina’s claim on the importance of accessing tax information in sev-
eral documents by the G20, OECD and the Global Forum (Panel report
7.509-7.513). It even considered the measures to have very little restrictive
impact on international trade, with the exception of one specific measure
(Panel report 7.727). The panel found that Panama was unable to identify
any ‘alternative measures reasonably available for Argentina less trade-
restrictive but with the same objectives’ (Bridges weekly, 21).
The panel did however dismiss Argentina’s claim that general GATS
exceptions allow using measures that violate GATS obligations. As
argued by Panama, paragraph 2(a) should be invoked only when the
measure in question qualifies as ‘domestic regulation’, such as a
‘supplier’s technical standard, qualification or license’ (Panel report
7.828). Practically, the decision delineated the legitimate policy space
available in implementing measures against tax evasion, and the extent
to which GATS exceptions can be invoked. The legal reason given for the
effective lock-in promoted by the panel was mostly based on the concept
of ‘likeness’ (Panel report 7.185–7.186). GATS stipulates that similar treat-
ment should be accorded to ‘like’ services from any origin. Interestingly,
the requirements for ‘like’ treatment include also service suppliers. In
addition to like treatment of ‘service suppliers’ of different origins, a
‘service supplier’ is defined in extremely broad terms (GATS XXVIII b,
g). Thus, the panel reasoned that Argentina treated services and service
suppliers from non-cooperative countries differently than those from co-
operative countries (Panel report 3.1.a-h). In the same vein, some of
Argentina’s measures were seen to accord less favorable treatment to
Panamanian services than like domestic services (Panel report 3.1 b-d).
The panel also noted that Argentina used origin as a basis for distin-
guishing service suppliers on which it imposed the contested measures.
The key point appeared to be, whether Argentina’s measures are
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accorded exclusively on the basis of origin. Superficially, of course, the
distinction used in Argentina’s measures was based exclusively on ori-
gin, since the problems arose directly from the tax haven regime of Pan-
ama. Eventually, ‘like services’ were defined as ‘services which are in a
competitive relationship’ (Panel report 7.159), and the burden of proof to
show that tax avoidance affects the competitive relationship of service
providers was put on Argentina (Panel report 7.179). The panel eventu-
ally found the evidence provided by Argentina insufficient.
The case highlights the diminishing policy space for effective work
against tax evasion when a tax-haven country manages to use epistemic
arbitrage through WTO. The recognition of Argentina’s purposes and the
lack of alternative means did not allow using the exceptions stipulated in
GATS. The Panel explicitly stated that all measures imposed by Argen-
tina fall under the scope of GATS. Therefore, anti-tax evasion policies can
become trade policy issues also in the future. While some of Panama’s
claims were rejected, all eight measures were seen as inconsistent with
GATS II:1 (Panel report 8.2.a), as they do not accord similar treatment to
like services from co-operative countries (Panel report 8.2.b). The appel-
late body further reversed some of the Panel’s findings, but this does not
remove the fact that all WTO organs considered the case to fall within
the scope of GATS. This turns trade agreements into policy tools for tax
havens, and potentially also for countries aiming to oppose them.
4.2. The case against Colombia’s anti-tax haven efforts
Another case in which Panama used trade treaties to challenge anti-
money laundering efforts was the case of Colombia in 2009. This case
once again demonstrates how a country can be forced to prioritize trade
agreement commitments over anti-money laundering policies, even
when their impact on trade is questionable.
Colombia is a prime example of a country suffering from the effects of
money laundering facilitated in great extent by Panama (Panel report
4.14211). According to estimates, over 80 per cent of Colombia’s trade
with Panama is contraband trade. Problems are further exacerbated by
the lack of control in Panama’s free trade zone Colon. It has been identi-
fied as a focal point for illicit trade (Panel report 4.60) and as a key point
for the laundering of Colombian narco-trafficking money. Panama’s
reported exports were threefold in comparison to Colombian imports
from Panama, which indicates under-invoicing and smuggling. Thus
Colombia was faced with an important domestic problem, which it
needed to address (Panel report 4.81).
The uncooperativeness of Panamanian authorities emptied Colombian
attempts to find common solutions (Panel report 4.85). The response rate
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to Colombian assistance requests in customs co-operation was 0.65 per
cent in 2001–2005 (Panel report 4.173). Therefore, Colombia decided to
introduce new measures, requiring certain Panamanian imports such as
footwear and textiles to enter through designated ports of entry (the air-
port of Bogota and the seaport of Barranquilla). These ports were mod-
ern, well-staffed and close to relevant markets, and had dedicated
personnel for contraband concerns (Panel report 4.5; 7.217). In addition,
Colombia established ‘indicative prices’ for certain products for dealing
with price distortions (Panel report 2.11). The policies were a rational
response to a well-established problem: they represented an effective use
of scarce means to counter a specific problem, and their trade-distortive
effect was designed to be minimal, or non-existent, (Panel report 4.171).12
Panama challenged these policies, claiming that the indicative prices
system discriminated internal tax in excess to taxes on like domestic
products, making it inconsistent with Article III:2 of the GATT 1994
(Panel report 4.18), as well as with parts of the Customs Valuation Agree-
ments (Panel report 4.44). Furthermore, Panama argued that restraining
the ports of entry imposed quantitative restrictions that were applied in a
discriminatory way (Panel report 4.33, 4.40), violating the Article XIII:1 of
the GATT 1994 (Panel report 4.32). In its response, Colombia maintained
its position that customs duties based on indicative prices should be seen
as a deposit rather than a payment (Panel report 4.100), and that Colum-
bia has the right to use these indicative prices in examining whether
declared values of goods are truthful or accurate (Panel report 4.105).
Moreover, Colombia claimed that Panama had failed to provide any evi-
dence proving that the referenced measures did indeed restrict trade
(Panel report 4.63).
In its decision, the Panel (WT/DS/366/9) found the indicative prices
measure inconsistent with the Agreement on customs valuation of the
GATT (Panel report 8.1, 8.2) and the ports of entry requirement inconsis-
tent with Article I.1, V:2, V:6 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994. The panel
rejected Colombia’s defense that the ports of entry measure was justified
under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 for securing compliance with
Colombia’s customs legislation (Panel report 8.7), and saw the indicative
prices as discriminatory payments rather than deposits (Panel report
7.87). The panel recognized that the measures were designed to secure
compliance with Colombian legislation and noted the importance of
combating under-invoicing and money laundering (Panel report 7.543,
7.566). Yet it found that Colombia had not proved that the ports of entry
measure contributed to these goals (Panel report 7.585, 7.588, 7.618). The
panel referred merely to the ‘undoubtedly’ increased transaction costs
for Panama. Colombia appears to have been penalized for simulta-
neously using several tools in its anti-money laundering efforts, as it had
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to assume the burden of proof. It would have been far easier to demon-
strate the marginal contribution of a single policy tool.
As a result, Colombia was forced to revise its policies. Furthermore, it
was expected to make the revisions within months, and thus to prioritize
fast compliance with the ruling over normal political and legislative pro-
cedures. Colombia requested a 15-month implementation period so that
it could explore legislative alternatives and their WTO-consistency for
complying with the Panel decision while continuing its anti-tax evasion
efforts (Arbitrator’s report, 13–15). Colombia suggested the increased
number of ports of entry required new legislation in order to continue its
anti-smuggling efforts. Once again, Panama managed to use the WTO
framework to force fast compliance at the expense of political sensibilities
(Arbitrator’s report, 111), even though some previous arbitrators had
noted that new legislations were based on the need to safeguard public
morals and order (Arbitrator’s report, 29). Panama saw the need to
address the underlying problems of customs fraud and contraband irrel-
evant in determining the pace of compliance. Panama thus saw the
implementation as separate from the removal of ‘underlying economic or
social conditions’ (Panama’s submission, para 6, referred to in Arbi-
trator’s report, 37).
Panama argued that there was no ‘unfettered right to any method of
implementation’, and that it only accepted the withdrawal of the indica-
tive prices and ports of entry measures (41). The claim was based on the
idea that any means to replace the ‘payment’ system in indicative prices
with a compulsory ‘guarantee’ system, and restraining the ports of entry,
would violate the same GATT articles (Agreement on customs valuation
and Article XI). Clearly, Panama aimed to ensure that the WTO process
would block any attempts to replace the measures with similar ones.
Several issues stand out in the challenge and in the decisions of the
Panel and the arbitrator. First, there was no existing precedent of such a
case. Second, the status of being a developing country did not deter Pan-
ama from entering the process. Third, Panama launched the case on
behalf of its offshore, not onshore, firms. What is more, the panel did not
require Panama to demonstrate that anti-money laundering rules had a
negative impact on trade. All these issues ought to have led to further
concern, that Panama (or other tax havens with similar characteristics)
could use FTAs to block progressive taxation policy by branding them as
inconsistent with trade treaties. For example the US-Panama FTA has
raised concerns that it provides Panama measures for similar legal strug-
gles against progressive tax legislation. While this concern has mostly
been voiced by the civil society (Tucker 2011), even the US administration
was hesitant to enter the FTA before signing a TIEA with Panama (Horn-
beck 2012, 2–3).
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5. RETHINKING THE TRADE-TAX NEXUS
Trade, investment, and tax policies have traditionally been seen as com-
plementary (Slemrod and Avi-Yonah 2001, 533), and the supranational
dimension of the WTO or other trade treaties has not been thought to
affect the operation of the international tax regime. When tax and trade
policies have been discussed together, they have usually been compared
to each other instead of analyzing the ways in which these two spheres
overlap (Rixen 2008, 178). While this arrangement did not cause any seri-
ous problems for long periods of time, the conflict between the interna-
tional trade and tax regimes has now become more pronounced (Bastin
2014; Brauner 2005, 256; EC 2014a; 2014b).
What is changing, to begin with, is the comprehensiveness and regula-
tive form of the policy domains. The WTO aims to harmonize domestic
legislation, operating in a virtual international economic space as an
interface between the various legal systems. In general, WTO does not
directly modify or relate to any specific domestic regulation, but rather
dictates standards with which member countries align their laws. Trade
treaties are based on pooling together sovereignty for a common cause,
which can either restrict or support international cooperation against tax
avoidance and evasion. In this sense, the pooling process differs
markedly from the pooling of sovereignty witnessed in the field of tax
policy, which is more typically geared to combating international tax
wars (Christensen and Shaxson 2016) between states than it is to acceler-
ating them (Genschel and Rixen 2015).
The trade policy regime, which was for a long time moving towards
more coherence, has reached something of an impasse. It is now evolving
again through a myriad of regional and bilateral treaties, and thus func-
tions as a platform for sporadic harmonization. In the case of tax policy,
on the other hand, there have been frequent attempts to form ever more
comprehensive policies, in part because there is a strong push for multi-
lateral solutions, manifested already in the development of multilateral
tax information exchange. This shifting dynamic also both intensifies
negotiations between the two policy domains, and creates more opportu-
nities for policies and business practices that seek to benefit from the
overlaps. In earlier decades, the fragmented international tax regime
could operate relatively independently from the coordinated trade
regime. Now, the increasingly patched trade policy regime can, in sur-
prising ways, affect efforts to build a more coordinated tax policy regime,
instead of being the policy domain dictating global uniformity in policies.
The increasing overlaps between trade and tax agendas create also
challenges for the prevailing theories in IR and global political economy
that have been used to explain these kinds of phenomena. In particular,
this calls for reassessment of the traditional theories of new
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constitutionalism. This theory has correctly pointed out that policies
advocated in trade deals to be very resistant to political change, and that
the ‘power of transnational capital depends on the form and character of
state institutions’ (Gill 2008, 116). However, our case studies show that
this lock-in should in some cases be seen rather as a tool for given gov-
ernments to push their agenda, instead of as a strict and pre-negotiated
limitation on the existing policy space, or even a ‘regulatory chill’. While
lock-in effect might be very real in the sense of effective insulation from
democratic politics, the case studies demonstrate that the ways that poli-
cies are locked in can be unanticipated when the treaties are signed. The
new constitutional theory generally does a good job in picturing the bal-
ance of power between capital and the political realm, but it typically
assumes that global uniform treaties limit the policy space especially of
smaller national states (Gill 2008, 138–142). Yet it appears that the power
of capital might enable even miniscule nations means to affect or direct
the power of mobile international capital. The ‘constitutional’ power in
trade policy needs to be understood not as a straightforward lock-in, but
rather locking in policy tools, which can be utilized by experts to differ-
ent ends.
Even though these notions might appear as purely theoretical in the
cases discussed at length above, in other instances a similar trade-tax
convergence can create tools for pushing for more progressive agendas.
As an example, we pointed out that the existing trade treaties could cre-
ate grounds for challenging aggressive transfer pricing regimes and poli-
cies. Moreover, we highlighted how the state aid regulation in the EU
has developed rather sporadically to a point where tax concessions
granted for companies like Starbucks and Apple are commonly seen as
illegal subsidies, even though the majority of the revenues to these Irish
and Luxembourgian subsidiaries come from other countries.
These notions point to the significance of the role of arbitration special-
ists not only in traditional trade issues (Schneiderman 2000), but also as
gatekeepers in trade disputes whose outcomes can either promote or hin-
der policies against tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax havens. Looking
at the myriad of different ways trade policies have influenced or can
influence tax policies through WTO, EU and other channels, it would be
a grave oversimplification to say that these developments would have
outright separated ‘the “economic” from the “political” and “locked in”
already-adopted free market policies through use of legal guarantees and
sanctions to favour private determination of economic policy’ (Gill
1998b, 25). Rather, the intertwining of tax and trade policies gives more
power to the agents that understand the connections between these pol-
icy spheres and can either exploit them or recruit the necessary expertise
for doing that. These agents can either be states or advocacy groups that
are able to make states to adopt their agenda. Thus while the outcome of
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the processes described above can indeed be in line with what is called
neoliberal, the politics are not outright ‘disciplinary’ (Gill 2008, 137–138),
but rather open a space for the experts to maneuver. In such a contested
space, the existing policy tools can well be locked-in in a very constitu-
tional manner, but the political outcomes are not completely closed or
predetermined. This can be highlighted also by the evolution of the EU
state aid regime: in absence of clear policy coordination from the Euro-
pean Council, the civil servants in the European Commission have grad-
ually expanded the state aid regime to include also tax avoidance issues.
Even though Panama has a population of less than 4 million people, it
has had the required expertise and the will to come up with ways to har-
ness WTO rules for promotion of its political goals. This expertise
appears to be significant in the cases described above, implying that geo-
political hegemony (Cox 1983) is not sufficient in analyzing political pos-
sibilities and limitations to maneuver in the context of global policy.
Rather, the cases are an example of epistemic arbitrage (Seabrooke 2014)
where the holders of particular kind of specialized information become
gatekeepers in policy-making. However, the examples highlighted earlier
by Bastin demonstrate that some other small or big state could do the
same by employing different GATS articles for curbing international tax
avoidance and evasion. What is more, the EC has also resorted to plenty
of improvisation in its gradual shift that has resulted in seeing some
aggressive corporate tax practices as state aid. In this case, the shift has
been a result of unwillingness of the European Council to provide politi-
cal guidance, which has increased the role of soft law and improvisation
in EC’s alignments.
As we noted briefly in the Section 2, this fragmentation can also greatly
affect the commercialization of sovereignty (Palan 2002). Whereas exist-
ing research has highlighted the importance of tax legislation and tax
advisory firms in attempts to lure investors and companies to tax havens
(Fichtner 2016; Hakelberg 2016; Sikka and Hampton 2005; Sikka 2008),
the Panama case studies demonstrate that the ways in which trade poli-
cies are enforced can also be a major factor. Secrecy jurisdictions have
typically been quick to copy new financial ‘innovations’ from each other,
and there is no reason to expect that the aggressive use of trade policies
would be an exception.
Much depends also on how major onshore states see the trade-tax
nexus. Traditionally, the United States has expressed the view that trade
agreements should not impact the national tax system(s). The rationale
behind this is that the interaction of tax systems should remain the sub-
ject of bilateral tax treaties. However, the EU has moved more aggres-
sively to bring trade and tax rules into closer harmonization for a long
time (McDaniel 2000, 1621). One potentially complicating factor is also
that both the United States and the EU host significant tax havens.
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Moreover, as noted in section two, trade policies can, in some cases, also
help to curtail international tax avoidance. In the case studies we demon-
strated how a ‘traditional tax haven’ focusing on banking and financial
secrecy practices was able to use trade policies to dodge attempts for bet-
ter tax regulation.
What lies in the future? Brauner suggests, that the international trade
and tax regimes should be co-ordinated, even though they cannot be sim-
ply reconciled. It is easy to second this call. According to Brauner, such
coordination would benefit from the establishment of an international
tax organization, separate from the WTO. Such an organization should
be tasked with the responsibility of making the evolving international tax
regime more compatible with the international trade regime (Brauner
2005, 254). The ‘disconnect’ between the trade and tax regimes is seen as
detrimental to the international tax regime (Brauner 2005, 258). Most
countries (including the United States) do not coordinate their trade and
tax regimes. As best expressed by one US scholar, ‘[t]his country’s tax
framework is about as poorly adapted to GATT as is imaginable’ (Brau-
ner 2005, 262). Recently, similar calls for international tax organization
(which in itself is an old idea) have been also voiced by prominent schol-
ars of international tax governance, such as Tanzi (2016).
Our contributions in this article are in part forward-looking. To the best
of our knowledge, only Panama has used the WTO complaint route to
put a curb on attempts to enforce anti-tax abuse rules. It remains to be
seen when and how other tax havens will follow its example. Given the
fast pace of mimicking of financial innovations in the offshore industry,
it would be surprising if other tax havens remained idle while Panama
vigorously defends its tax regime.
We note that further research could be conducted in at least four fields.
First, the existing WTO treaties may have an impact on recent interna-
tional policy measures for the regulation of international tax matters. Sec-
ond, since the early 2000s, the focus of trade policy discussions has
shifted from the WTO to regional and bilateral treaties. This new and
more dispersed body of regulation can also have diverse impacts on
international tax regulation. And third, further studies could be done on
the relationship between the international tax regime and other policy
areas. As for example, most of the debt conditionalities imposed by the
World Bank, the IMF, and more recently by the EU typically include a
myriad of tax-related provisions. Given the large number of these pro-
grams during the past 35 years, their impact on the international tax
regime must also be considerable. Fourth, motifs behind Panama’s
actions merit further research: why and how Panama ended up choosing
WTO as a platform to defend its secrecy regime?
In addition to the broad analysis of global tax governance and the role
of FTAs, we suggest that the theory of new constitutionalism should also
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accommodate notions rising from the analysis presented above. Specifi-
cally, ‘locking in’ policies should not be seen as only restricting demo-
cratic sovereignty with supranational ‘constitutional’ means. As we have
shown, the politics of new constitutionalism in trade policy can also
mean locking in the power of globalized capital by providing political
tools for ‘commercialized sovereigns’ to resist attempts to universalize
and harmonize progressive schemes within other policy fields. Thus the
study of the intersections of trade and tax policy also calls for further the-
oretical reconsideration.
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NOTES
1. Many of these initiatives (especially the ones related to information
exchange) address also other issues than just tax-haven tax avoidance.
2. Neo-realist scholars would argue that this forum shifting is made possible by
overlapping ‘regime complexes’ (e.g. Orsini et al. 2013 and Keohane and Vic-
tor 2010), which enable political players to advocate similar measures under
various regimes.
3. We speak interexchangeably of tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions. Devel-
oped originally by Murphy (2008, see also Meinzer 2016, 268), the latter con-
cept is less known but more accurate, since secrecy is the most important
characteristic of tax haven structures. The choice of terms is more than
semantics, not least because any meaningful definition or listing of tax
havens has to take into account prevailing secrecy laws and practices.
4. See e.g. NAFTA Arbitration pursuant in chapter 20 on the matter of cross-
border trucking services (File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01), Final report of the
panel, x259-260.
5. Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, 1994.
6. In addition to small island states such as Panama, the index features also sev-
eral major powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom as the
City of London is also a major tax haven. The top three jurisdictions in the
2015 index are Switzerland, Hong Kong and the United States, the latter
because the combination of a great importance in the world economy and
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serious defects in company ownership data, publicity and international tax
information exchange.
7. An exception was the post 9/11 situation, when Panama followed many
other Caribbean tax havens in agreeing to exchange tax information with the
United States in late 2001 and early 2002 (Sharman 2006, 74). Moreover, ITIO
later changed its name to International Trade and Investment Organisation.
8. As a further detail, the Nordic group also involved the Faroe Islands and
Greenland. The relatively small combined economic importance of these
countries led some scholars to judge the OECD’s blacklist exercise as white-
washing (e.g. Sawyer 2011).
9. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Republic of Panama for Cooperation and the
Exchange of Information Relating to Taxes (2010) and Agreement Between
Canada and The Republic Of Panama for Tax Cooperation and the Exchange
of Information Relating to Taxes (2013).
10. We use ‘Panel report’ to refer to WTO (2015) and ‘Appellate body’s report’ to
refer to WTO (2016) in this subchapter. Numbers in these references refer to
paragraphs in the document, not page numbers.
11. We use ‘Panel report’ to refer to WTO (20009a) and ‘Arbitrator’s report’ to
refer to WTO (2009b) in this subchapter. Numbers in these references refer
to paragraphs in the document, not page numbers.
12. Apart from the location and adequate staffing of the ports, the indicative pri-
ces were based on market surveys.
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